

WAR, AND STATE MAKING AT THE END OF EMPIRE:

OTTOMAN COLLAPSE AND THE FORMATION OF THE BALKAN STATES

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While the connection between war and state making in the ascendancy of the Western state system has been well explored, the war-state linkages in the peripheries of the Great Powers, especially in times of imperial decline and collapse, have attracted insufficient attention amongst peace and conflict studies analysts. What is missing in the literature is an explicit and focused comparison between state formation in the non-Western sphere and in Western Europe, which has provided the template for modern state making in the rest of the world. Moreover, there is limited realization that outside Western Europe the state has not been the offspring of the nation; on the contrary, the reverse has been the case. Modern state formation—more often than not—has been grounded in the violence of war which has brought into being that which national leaders have claimed war reflects, that is, the nation. This contribution helps reinforce this missing realization in peace and conflict studies by revisiting the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 in order to underpin correlations between state making and political violence, and their mediation by the exclusivist ideology of ethnic nationalism and growing Great Power influence.

INTRODUCTION

It is widely accepted that the study of war is essential to the pursuit of peace. Indeed, a substantial part of peace studies is dedicated to the understanding of the nature and character of war in particular, and conflict in general. It is because peace studies investigates causes

and consequences of conflicts, as well as preconditions for peace, that the discipline is also known as peace and conflict studies.¹ War and peace have greatly conditioned humans and their institutions and forms of organization as much as humans have shaped war and peace. But it is one actor in particular, namely the state, that in modern times has been most frequently at the very center of the war-peace nexus. Implicitly, a study on state making connects to peacebuilding because states are the main institutionalized actors that build peace.² But they are also mostly responsible for waging wars.³ States have been, and continue to be, responsible for initiating wars, their execution, and also their termination, in which processes states themselves have aggrandized, contracted, and sometimes disintegrated.

Many great thinkers on the problem of war, from Heraclitus to Machiavelli to Charles Tilly, have stressed this inherent connection between war and the state.⁴ They have offered critical contributions which interpret war as one of the most enduring ways of effecting change in the political arena. Although costly, war has been perceived as a rational means at the hands of the state in pursuit of official interests defined in terms of state and national security, such as control of territories and their population and resources. In the course of the ascendancy of the state system, especially in Western European history, war making and state making have been intrinsically linked, a phenomenon which has found expression in many works concerned especially with the behavior of the Great Powers in wartime.⁵ However, the war and state making linkage in the peripheries of the Great Powers, especially in crucial times such as those associated with imperial decline and collapse, has not attracted sufficient attention from analysts.

What is missing from peace studies is an explicit and focused comparison between state formation in the Western Europe and non-Western sphere, and a realization that outside

Western Europe the state has not been the offspring of the nation. Moreover, the formation of states has been grounded in the violence of war which has involved—as Jacques Derrida suggests—a performative force, a *coup de force*, in the sense that the founding of a nation, state, or nation-state consists in a fiction or simulacrum “that brings to daylight ... that which one claims to reflect ... the unity of a nation, the founding of a state, while one is in the act of producing that event.”⁶ This article uses the case of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 to underpin correlations between state making and political violence with reference to some distinctive features of state formation processes related to the spatial definition of new states and nations and role of Great Powers pertaining to these wars. It shows that the simulacrum identified above has not been produced exclusively by the elites of the nation but has been conditioned, modified, and shaped by Great Power diplomacy. The focus of this study therefore is upon the *initial* phases of state formation (or state making) in the south-east corner of the European continent.

In conformity with the interdisciplinary practice of peace and conflict studies, the analysis engages with sources from sociology, political science, history, and anthropology. It is grounded in a reading of existing literature on war and state formation in Western Europe due to the fact that the Western nation state model has served as a template for the creation of modern Balkan states. Central to its analysis, however, are the main subject matters of peace and conflict studies, namely, peace, power, conflict, and violence—matters that in the war and state making setting of the Balkans have been frequently integrated in combustible forms.

In the short interval of a few months two historic wars engulfed the Balkan peninsula in the years 1912 and 1913. The first one (October 1912—May 1913) was fought by Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia (a coalition known as the Balkan League) against the

Ottoman Empire. The second war (June—July 1913) was initiated by Bulgaria against Serbia and Greece, which, in coalition, defeated Bulgarian troops and redistributed the contested territory of Ottoman Macedonia mostly amongst the winners.⁷ Hence, in the wake of these wars, a new interconnection emerged between territory and people, and new state boundaries established by means of force were incorporated in international treaties. As demarcation lines, borders manifested claims of state authority and territoriality, providing officials with a point of reference within which their activities were authorized. State boundaries became crucially important not only for what they contained (human, economic, and geo-strategic resources which constituted important factors of state strength and identity) but also for leaving outside desired territories and co-ethnics, exclusions that gave way to persistent irredentist claims.⁸

The analysis begins by identifying common and distinctive trends in the processes of state formation in Western Europe and South East Europe (aka the Balkans). It emphasizes that war as “a social institution that utilizes military force and coercion for political purposes”⁹ has had strong impact on the formation of states in South East Europe just like in the West. However, both the international (external) and national contexts of state making in the West and East of the European continent have differed noticeably. With regard to the external context, processes of state making have become increasingly more impacted by the influence, and interference, of Great Powers; whereas with regard to the internal setting challenges of nationalism and politicization of ethnic heterogeneity have been distinctive features of state making in South East Europe unlike the case of Western Europe.

After setting the stage by identifying commonalities and differences of state formation in South East and Western Europe, the analysis gauges the causes of the Balkan Wars. It

explores, also, how politicization of ethnic heterogeneity complicated nation-state making efforts and how violence acted as a tool of delineating state boundaries. In the next step, the analysis considers explicitly external processes of state-making with reference to the role of the Great Powers. It shows that the decline of the Ottoman Empire presented the Great Powers of the time—Austria-Hungary, Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia—with opportunities for influencing the Balkan states, but also with risks of confrontation and therefore challenges to the security and stability of the region and the continent. Exerting strong influence on the Balkan parties, the Great Powers aimed to direct the impending change towards outcomes that would satisfy their interests while at the same time trying to accommodate (competing) aspirations of nationalist elites. In conclusion, the article summarizes the distinctive trends of state formation in the Balkans and emphasizes the need for incorporating (aspects of) state building and nation building in a comprehensive analysis of state making, an integration which is minimally present in the existing accounts of the formation of states in the West and, by extension, within the field of peace and conflict studies.

Common and distinctive trends in state formation of Western and South-East Europe

In his seminal analysis of state making in the European continent Charles Tilly argued that “from AD 990 onwards, major mobilizations for war provided the chief occasion on which states expanded, consolidated, and created new forms of political organization.”¹⁰ Those with substantial means used force to get compliance and multiple goods and advantages denied to less powerful people. Europeans followed what Tilly calls a “standard war-provoking logic”: those who controlled substantial coercive means sought to maintain a secure area within which returns from coercion could be enjoyed and surround it with a fortified buffer zone. Armed forces patrolled the buffer zone and sought to turn it into a secure area while

concurrently venturing outside it. In the process the buffer zone turned into a secure area, which “encouraged the wielder of coercion in order to acquire a new buffer zone surrounding the old. So long as adjacent powers were pursuing the same logic, war resulted.”¹¹ This is an important depiction of the relation between coercion and acquisition of territory in the West that has great relevance to other regions including the Balkans.

In an earlier work, Tilly and his collaborators paid attention to success in war and its impact on state making. They found that the building of an effective military machine—the army—promoted “territorial consolidation, centralization, differentiation of the instruments of government and monopolization of the means of coercion, all the fundamental state-making processes.” Put differently, “war made the state, and the state made war.”¹² In particular, “wars became the principal means by which the realignments of the participants and their boundaries occurred, the principal moments at which multiple changes of membership and alliance occurred, as well as principal occasions on which the relations between rulers and ruled changed rapidly.”¹³ Until the eighteenth century European statesmen did not spend much time anticipating or attending to popular demands. While establishing direct rule, European states shifted from reactive to proactive repression. Rebellions were punished forcibly. Civilian populations were disarmed. At the same time, within their boundaries states undertook to impose national languages, national educational systems, and national military services. Externally, European states controlled movements across boundaries and treated foreigners as distinctive kinds of peoples entitled only to limited rights. Consequently, Tilly concludes, “life homogenized within states and heterogenized among states. ... War itself became a homogenizing experience, as soldiers and sailors represented the entire nation and the civilian population endured common ... responsibilities.”¹⁴

War settlements codified national borders and realignments of identities first in Europe and then beyond. In 1500 European states held political control over about 7 percent of the earth's land, 35 percent in 1800, and 84 percent in 1914.¹⁵ Thus the national state served as a template for state formation in the rest of the world. Moreover, the expansion of this template ensured a move from “a relatively ‘internal’ to a strongly ‘external’” state formation process—a trend that has continued and accelerated through to the present era.¹⁶ As Tilly notes:

[C]ompacts of powerful states have increasingly narrowed the limits within which any national struggle for power occurred. They have done so through imposition of international war settlements, ... diffusion of standard models for armies, bureaucracies, and other elements of the state apparatus, creation of international organizations charged with tending the state system, collective guarantee of national borders, and intervention to maintain domestic order. That narrowing restricted the alternative paths of state formation. Throughout the world state formation converged on the more or less deliberate construction of national states ... according to models offered, subsidised, and enforced by the great powers.¹⁷

Samuel Finer has opined that national states—in the European image—have come to acquire five salient characteristics: (1) they are *territorially* defined populations that recognize a common paramount organ of government; (2) the government consists of specialized personnel; the *civil* service that carries out government's decisions and the *military* service that backs these by force where necessary; (3) each state is recognized by other states as independent in its action upon its subjects (a recognition that constitutes “international sovereignty”); (4) the population residing within the state forms a community of feeling based on self-consciousness of a common *nationality*; and (5) the population forms a

community in the sense that—in principle, at least—its members mutually distribute and share duties and benefits.¹⁸ The first three characteristics are constitutive features of state building whereas the last two are associated with nation building. For the purposes of terminology clarification, it is worth noting that state building involves territoriality and function (closely associated with workings of government institutions), whereas nation building refers to processes whereby state elites render the boundaries of the state congruent with those of the nation.¹⁹

The above mentioned five characteristics of modern states find expression in the notion of *stateness*, which can be conceived as a feature of statehood. As the European model of state expanded, the world has moved gradually towards stateness, in that, the processes of state making have centered on “consolidation of territorial control, differentiation of governments from other organizations, acquisition of autonomy (and mutual recognition thereof) by some governments, centralization and coordination.”²⁰ By the nineteenth century virtually all West European governments had arrived at “a relatively high level of stateness, measured by formal autonomy, differentiation from nongovernmental organizations, centralization, and internal coordination.”²¹ However, by this time most of the present Balkan states were just embarking on initial processes that would eventually lead them to statehood in the course of the disintegration of the Ottoman rule.

In terms of demography, in both Western and Eastern Europe state formation proceeded over large predominantly peasant masses. This feature—the predominantly peasant composition of populations—accrued added value to territory due to the fact that a great part of resources that could be used for state building were land-related. In addition, the predominance of peasantry implied that co-opting the class of landlords was crucial to states’ efforts to access

land resources that this class controlled. The peasantry of the Western states was *relatively* homogenous in cultural terms (some suggest as early as 1300)²² due to processes of unification under the Roman Empire and (deliberate) institution by state elites of a national language, a state religion, mass public instruction, and sometimes expulsion of ethnic minorities.

It bears emphasizing that what is stressed here is *relative* homogeneity rather than full homogeneity. It cannot be denied that the West was, and remains, diverse. It is not assumed here that Western populations were fully homogenous by nineteenth century but that *in relative terms* they were more homogenous than nations living under Ottoman rule. Hence, throughout, this study refers to populations in Western states as “relatively homogeneous” rather than “homogenous.” A brief glimpse at the complex picture of interethnic mingling in the Ottoman Empire illustrates the utility of drawing this distinction. The free movement of people within a land empire without hard national boundaries enabled a far greater mingling of nationalities than was the case among the states of Western Europe. Just before the onset of the First Balkan War, out of six million inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire who lived in Europe, around 3.5 million were Orthodox Christians (Bulgarian, Serb, and Greek) and 2.3 million Muslims (of various backgrounds).²³ National identities among Christians, however, were not so clear-cut. Although some Christians would have identified as Bulgarian, Serb, or Greek, national identities were not well-formed among much of the Christian population and it was not uncommon for their national affiliations to shift. In stark contrast to Eugen Weber’s finding that as late as 1870, when about one quarter the inhabitants of France did not speak French, most “knew themselves to be French subjects (even as whole regions felt “little identity with the state or with other regions”), minorities in the Balkan states frequently refrained from designating themselves as subjects of the state in which they lived.”²⁴

The relative homogeneity of populations in the Western Europe was a facilitating factor in the emergence of West European national states especially because it eased the division of lands into exclusive territories (although some of them were subjected to subsequent change). Furthermore, this relative homogeneity facilitated construction of unified states by lowering the cost of state making insofar as it rendered uniform administrative arrangements feasible, promoted loyalty and solidarity of subject population, and made uniform communication systems available to the rulers.²⁵ In the long run, the relative cultural homogeneity of the population residing within the boundaries of a given (Western) state eased the task of nation building—the development of national consciousness and commitment to one’s nation and one’s state. Samuel Finer’s definition of the state mentioned above incorporates nation building in the conception and practice of state making. But Charles Tilly has insisted on “the analytic separation of state-building from nation-building” in the context of analyzing state formation in Western Europe because, here, nation building generally occurred after the formation of strong states.²⁶ This analytic separation may be justified in the Western European setting where a relative cultural homogeneity was attained early on at the outset of state making. Nevertheless, when state formation proceeds over largely heterogeneous populations as in the case of the Balkans, nation building becomes an intrinsic part of state making. Therefore, analyzing processes of state formation that proceed over largely heterogeneous populations warrants taking into consideration both aspects of state building and nation building.

Given that Western states acquired relative homogeneity in early stages of their state formation, which in turn facilitated drawing of boundaries and governance of populations, it is to be expected that nationalism—as an ideology that advocates congruence between the state boundaries and ethnic identity of the people who live within them²⁷ — did not play a

crucial role in Western states formation processes. Indeed, it is from the French Revolution onwards that national or ethnic identity became important bases of mass mobilization. It follows, therefore, that nationalism (as a modern ideology) appeared only in the late stages of West European state formation, by which time Western states had already acquired a strong level of stateness. This is not the case with state formation in the Balkans. The latter processes of state formation—in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—coincided with the consolidation, utilization, and manipulation of nationalist ideology, as will be emphasized below.²⁸

The time frames within which national states emerged in Western Europe and South East Europe provide, perhaps, the greatest contrast between the formation of states in the West and East of the European continent. Western states had a great advantage in terms of available time—measured in centuries—in addressing, adjusting, and molding challenges encountered in the processes of establishing their states. In South East Europe the formation of states was compressed in time, with modern states emerging in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries following the decline and eventual collapse of the Ottoman Empire that ruled these lands for nearly five centuries: Serbia between 1815 and 1830, Greece in 1830, Romania in 1862, and Montenegro and Bulgaria in 1878 with several wars altering their boundaries subsequently, and Albania and Turkey emerging at the end of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13.²⁹ Sydney Verba notes of this interval that “[w]hat Britain took centuries to do—solve the problems of identity, legitimacy, participation, and distribution—the new nations have to do in the briefest span of time.”³⁰ This simple observation contains an important fact, namely that in the short span of time in which Balkan states were formed their national elites were faced with a crucial cumulation of both state building and nation building challenges as they strived to

cope with contested claims to territory and ethnic heterogeneity in addition to final struggles with the Ottoman Empire and competing Great Powers' interests.

Stein Rokkan has observed that this cumulation of challenges during the final struggle for secession from the empire and formation of national states constitutes a fundamental contrast between the older Western systems and the newer systems emerging from the breakup of great empires.

[T]he latecomers were not only late in achieving sovereign status, they were left with only a minimum of time to build up their institutions before they were faced with disruptive pressures from outside as well as from inside. The older systems developed in a multicentered international environment without any dominant models of successful development, with very slow transportation networks, and without any technologies for quick mass mobilization. The latecomers were faced with highly visible models of successful development, strong and polarized outside centres of economic and ideological influence, rapid means of communication in and out of each system, advanced technologies of mass mobilization.³¹

To sum up, this concise overview of key texts on state formation in Western Europe suggests that war is the characteristic condition of the state system in so far as major mobilizations for war, and success in war, have provided the principal occasion for creation, expansion and consolidation of modern states. The older national states of Western Europe established a relative cultural homogeneity and acquired a great level of stateness early in the process of state formation and prior to the age of nationalism. In contrast, as will be elaborated below, the latecomers in the state system—such as the Balkan states—were faced with immense

challenges both to state- and nation building as they struggled to resolve competing claims to territory and proceeded to construct nations over fluid, heterogeneous ethnic groups, while simultaneously contesting the Ottoman rule and courting support of the Great Powers. While the analysis of state formation in Western Europe provided by Tilly and his collaborators could afford to neglect “ethnic fragmentation”³² and “the international context of any particular [Western] state’s emergence and growth”³³ such neglect could be a grave error when analyzing the emergence of Balkan states. Grounding the analysis in the existing literature of state formation in Western Europe—a model that became the template for state formation in the rest of the world—this section has identified distinctive aspects of state making in the Balkan setting. The ensuing sections will explore conditions of state making in the context of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 with the view of casting into sharper relief those distinctive aspects referred to above.

ON THE CAUSES OF THE BALKAN WARS

The causes of the First and Second Balkan Wars are not easy to relate in the limited space available here.³⁴ This section, however, identifies the main factors that paved the way to these wars. It shows that the conditions that produced the Balkan Wars of early twentieth century were characterized by the increasing influence of nationalism, especially in its irredentist form³⁵ and heavy involvement of Great Powers of the time—Austria-Hungary, Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia. This section gives particular attention to the former aspect. The role of the Great Powers in the formation of Balkan states will be considered in greater detail in the next section.

The Balkan Wars of 1912-13, and the entire process of national state formation in South East Europe, cannot be understood outside the framework of the Eastern Question, that is,

problems created by the decline and gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the attempts of the Great Powers to delineate their spheres of influence in the territories of this empire by means of creating proxy states.³⁶ These problems persisted for a century and a half prior to the Ottoman collapse and constituted the most intractable diplomatic issue of this time. The more the empire declined the more economic and strategic interests of the Great Powers in its territories entangled. Great Power rivalries placed the Balkans at the very center of the Eastern Question and the endeavors of powerful states to address it.³⁷

The weakening of the Ottoman Empire manifested itself in a systematic loss of territories in the nineteenth century when the Ottomans ceded large tracts of North Africa to the British and the French. In Europe, amidst an eleven-year-long secessionist war, the Greek state emerged in 1830. Serbian, Montenegrin and Romanian nationalists engaged in a number of revolts achieving secession from the Ottoman Empire in 1878 following the end of the Russo-Turkish War (1877-78, in which they sided with Russia).³⁸ The latter war, together with the Turco-Italian War (1911-1912, known also as the Libyan War)—both of which the Ottomans lost—were historic events with dire repercussions for the survival of the empire. With regard to the latter, the Ottoman defeat in Libya had imminent consequences in denting Ottoman prestige and exposing Ottoman military weakness, which ultimately encouraged the Balkan states to attack the Ottoman forces in October 1912. The Ottoman defeat in the war with Russia had direct repercussions for the decline of the Empire and the nurturing of the Balkan nationalism and national states.

The San Stefano Treaty of March 3, 1878 that concluded the Russo-Turkish War established an extensive Bulgarian state (that included Macedonia and a large section of eastern Balkans), with Russian geopolitical interests playing a large role in the delineation of new

borders.³⁹ Montenegro was also a winner; it nearly tripled its territory. But the peace treaty signed at San Stefano jeopardized interests of European Great Powers, which were concerned about the prospects of Russian domination of the Balkans.⁴⁰ In addition, the San Stefano Treaty created political friction between Bulgarian nationalists, on the one hand, and their Greek and Serb counterparts, on the other, for the remainder of the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth; Bulgarians saw the San Stefano Treaty as a vindication of their rights over extensive territories, while Greeks and Serbs were alarmed because they laid claim to lands assigned to Bulgaria. Pressured by Austro-Hungary to revise the terms of the San-Stefano Treaty, the Russians agreed to revisions. Talks ensued in a Congress held in Berlin from June 13—July 13, 1878.

The Treaty of Berlin partitioned Bulgaria, with Macedonia and the province of Eastern Rumelia being restored to the Ottomans (the latter reverted to Bulgaria in 1885). Such was the extent of changes that Bulgaria's borders sanctioned in Berlin incorporated only 37.5 percent of Bulgarian territory agreed at San Stefano. Henceforth, "the new Bulgarian state was to enter into life with a ready-made programme for territorial expansion and a burning sense of the injustice meted out to it by the Great Powers."⁴¹ Whilst Macedonia had stood outside general political evaluations of the Balkans until this point, with the Berlin Treaty Macedonia entered the international political stage for good. Indeed, to a considerable degree, Balkan diplomacy after 1878 revolved around the question of division of Macedonia amongst Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia. Article 23 of the Berlin Treaty conditioned restoration of Macedonia to the Ottoman Empire upon reform and provision of religious (read Christian) liberties. Six Great Powers were granted the right to intervene in Macedonian affairs in order to supervise reform implementation. On the one hand, these provisions encouraged aspirations of Christians for independence from the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, these

very nationalist aspirations induced the Ottoman authorities to delay or obstruct the demanded reform.⁴² This clash of interests did not bode well for success of reform. Moreover, the half-hearted measures adopted by imperial authorities came to be opposed by local Muslims who saw reform threatening their position. The growing dependency of the Ottoman Empire on European powers, loss of wars with Russia and Italy, internal dissent and revolt, and lack of reform, weakened the empire beyond repair.⁴³

Numerous local uprisings against the empire further dented the authority and ability of the Ottoman government, also known as “the Porte,” to run and control Balkan lands. One significant revolt—prior to the Balkan Wars—was the Ilinden Uprising in Macedonia in 1903 (carried out by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—funded by the Bulgarian government). Another was the Kosovar Albanian revolt in 1910 led by Isa Boletini and Idriz Seferi against Young Turks’ policy of raising taxes, adaptation of Turkish as the language of provincial administration, disarming Albanians and conscripting them in the Ottoman Army. A subsequent Albanian revolt the following year showed the impossibility of maintaining the unity of population of the Ottoman Empire, even the unity of Muslim communities. This realization stimulated Turkish nationalism. Towards these uprisings the Ottomans reacted with overwhelming force which in turn alienated further the local population. These factors are widely considered to have paved the way for the Balkan Wars 1912-1913.

Wesley Hiers and Andreas Wimmer have argued convincingly that “the weakening of empire by previous nation-state formations or nationalist wars of liberation in other parts of the empire further promote the creation of nation-states.”⁴⁴ Their study found that nationalist movements have played an important role in all cases of imperial collapse. At the same time,

nationalism can profit from the weakening of empire brought about, for instance, by wars lost by empires or the nationalist wars of liberation fought in its territory. Sociological analyses of the relationship between war and nationalism emphasize the importance of *longue durée* processes on the emergence of both nationalism and war. In the case of the Balkans, Siniša Malešević has suggested that:

[T]he intensive and, for the most part, highly coercive state building programmes brought about spectacular organizational changes so that by the end of nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, most Balkan states had changed beyond recognition. The increasing cumulative bureaucratization of coercion resulted in the creation of massive state apparatuses: all Balkan polities had introduced universal conscription, established military academies, increased military budgets and set up large armies. For example between 1872 and 1895 the Greek officer corps expanded by 240 percent and the size of its army was constantly rising so that by the beginning of the 20th century it amounted to 150,000 soldiers; in Serbia in just ten years (1893-1903) the military grew fourfold, while the Bulgarian army was exponentially increasing. The result was that by the beginning of the First Balkan War [1912] these three small states were able to mobilize up to a million soldiers.⁴⁵

In other words, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Balkans experienced a systematic increase in the organizational and coercive capacity of the state, which is a crucial precondition for waging war.

Unlike the case of Western Europe where states existed long before the era of nationalism, state formation in the south eastern part of the continent occurred in the age of nationalism

when mass political participation was a key instrument of legitimation. Nationalism was “the hegemonic discourse of sovereignty”, an indispensable language of those playing the game of statehood.⁴⁶ As Theodora Dragostinova has observed, “speaking national” became a useful frame of reference for both official policies and ordinary people’s demands. Invocation of the nation brought together large masses of people with various understandings of nationality and non-uniform expectations from the nation state. Officials used national arguments as a discourse of entitlement, a justification for their authority over claimed territories, whereas ordinary people employed the national idiom in their encounters with the administrators, hoping to improve their precarious situations within aggressively nationalizing states.⁴⁷ On the face of it, the language of nationalism— “speaking national” —camouflages the fact that in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Balkan peasantry, who constituted the majority of the population, had no clear idea of national belonging as they tended to identify with the local (as opposed to the national) or a broader community of believers (religion). The difficulty of assigning nationality (membership in the national community) allowed national activism to play a crucial role both prior to the fighting and during its course. It is striking how in grappling with the difficulty of assigning nationality, opposing nationalist campaigns of Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs developed interrelated and similar tactics to achieve (irreconcilable) policies aiming at national unity—tactics and policies epitomized in the struggle over control of Ottoman Macedonia.

Macedonia was the typical Ottoman space, with mixed groups living side by side observing their religion. Until as late as the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, no such thing as a Macedonian identity yet existed and regional states claimed that the inhabitants of Macedonia were Bulgarian, Greek, or Serbs. The local population spoke a Slavic dialect that resembled the Bulgarian language. Serbs claimed that population of Macedonia was Serbian because their

folk customs were similar to those of the Serbs. Greece claimed that the Slavic population of Macedonia were Slavic-speaking Greeks because they were Orthodox Christians.⁴⁸ Within such a setting, locals had no strong national convictions. Their national identification was volatile and they frequently changed their professed national loyalties. British journalist H. N. Brailsfords noted this phenomenon when he travelled to Macedonia between 1902 and 1904, writing, “It is not uncommon to find fathers who are themselves officially ‘Greeks’, equally proud of bringing into the world ‘Greek’, ‘Serbian’, ‘Bulgarian’, and ‘Rumanian’ children. ... I was talking to a wealthy peasant. ... ‘Is your village Greek’, I asked him, ‘or Bulgarian?’ ‘Well’”, he replied, “it is Bulgarian now but four years ago it was Greek. The answer seemed to him natural and commonplace.”⁴⁹

Diverse demography and an intensely local sense of identity created insurmountable obstacles for national movements seeking to delineate national boundaries in a highly multiethnic environment. The scramble for Macedonia was a formative event for Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia as a struggle to redeem what supposedly belonged to the nation, and to place inhabitants of Macedonia into national frames. Each nationalist movement sought to undercut the influence of their counterparts among the local population by sponsoring schools run in their respective national language, philanthropic institutions, political organizations, and armed bands which worked to secure recruits for their respective national agendas.⁵⁰

Civil unrest, in the form of violence and lawlessness, was rampant. John Lampe has aptly noted that “Macedonia was the prototype for a powder keg.”⁵¹ He traces vulnerabilities of Macedonia to the creation of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, or Exarchate in 1870—generally accepted as the origin of the so called Macedonian Question, which became the litmus test for the ability of the three above mentioned national movements to achieve their

national aspirations.⁵² These national movements articulated their agendas not exclusively against the Ottoman Empire but also in opposition to each other. While their competition in the first half of the nineteenth century centred on education, in the second half national opposition saw a shift from language to religion. Bulgarian nationalists challenged the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul—dubbed as the “Greek Church” because the Bulgarian elite believed that it supported the Greek cause at the detriment of the Bulgarian population.

The Porte allowed the establishment of Exarchate in 1870 because for the Ottoman authorities the question of the Bulgarian Church was an anti-Greek movement rather than an anti-Ottoman one. “The process of delineating the Exarchate’s sphere of influence against the Patriarchate outlined the realms of the Bulgarian nation in the Ottoman Empire.”⁵³ Essentially, the contest over Macedonia reflects struggles over control of territory justified in terms of nationalist ideologies constructed upon distinct markers, namely, language and religion—a feature of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and subsequent state making wars, such as those of the 1990s. From a political standpoint, the Macedonian question was an integral part of the Eastern Question.⁵⁴ The “solution” of the Macedonian Question by means of the Second Balkan War constituted also the termination of the Eastern Question.

THE ROLE OF GREAT POWERS IN (FRUSTRATING) PEACEMAKING⁵⁵

As emphasized above, one of the most striking differences between state formation in Western Europe and in South East Europe is that the former processes were primarily internal whereas the later were highly external. In fact, as Charles Tilly has pointed out, state formation processes in the twentieth century may be considered to be triply external: many of the new states were formerly colonial possessions of other states or empires; their institutions

(including government and army) were built under the influence of a greater power; and the existence of the new states in the international system was guaranteed (sanctioned and recognized) by the Great Powers.⁵⁶ Scholars are divided as to whether nationalism as a justifying ideology for modern state formation can be seen as one that was conceived in the West and then metamorphosed in East European (and generally non-Western) setting, or as part of a *longue durée* process of urbanization, bureaucratization, and evolution in communication and technology—in short a process intimately linked to modernity—where there was relative synchronicity of Eastern and Western Europe.⁵⁷ Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that in providing legitimation of stable and prosperous Western states, nationalism provided also aspiration for the leaders of the emerging Balkan countries to build their national states in Western images. Numerous conflicts that befell the Balkans in the nineteenth century and the subsequent wars of 1912-1913, combined with the gradual collapse of the Ottoman Empire, fostered nationalism as an ideology that justified emerging national states, although “the national sentiment among the masses was not particularly strong.”⁵⁸

External interference in internal affairs of states is a constant feature of the international system. Reasons for external involvement are case- and context specific but some generalizations have been posited by scholars of interventions. Some of them have suggested that external involvement results from common ethnic ties, i.e., the external power’s aim to protect its co-nationals.⁵⁹ Others have suggested that intervention (in non-military and military forms) can stem from the external actor’s desire to destabilize a neighbor, influence a conflict’s outcome, and secure resources and regional influence.⁶⁰ These motivations for intervention need not exclude each other. As evidenced above in the case of interference of Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia in Ottoman Macedonia, both ethnic and geo-strategic

considerations can motivate external intervention. The complementarity of these factors is particularly evident in the rationale of Great Powers' interventions in the Balkan peninsula in the process of emerging national states and afterwards.

The Great Powers' competition for spheres of influence in the Ottoman Empire took the form of establishing friendly states—as a means of resolving the Eastern Question. Russia was particularly active in the process of national agitation of Slavic people living in the Ottoman Empire. According to Richard J. Crampton, Moscow exercised strong influence in Bulgaria (also in Serbia) because of claimed ancient cultural ties and because of a sense of Slavic solidarity.⁶¹ But this emphasis on ethnic ties overlooks the geo-strategic interests involved. Sevtap Demirci and Hakan Yavuz have noted that Russia sought to use the pretence of protecting Slavic rights in order to exploit irredentist claims of the Balkan peoples with the aim of weakening the Ottoman state.⁶² Moreover, Russia's sponsorship of alliances between Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro (in the form of the Balkan League) served that aim. The main goal behind Russia's Balkans policy was to expand south into the Black Sea region with the view of controlling the Strait—a gateway of immense strategic importance between the Balkans and Asia.⁶³

Of the six Great Powers involved with the resolution of the Eastern Question France, Germany, and Great Britain, had a less critical role than that of Russia. France, for its part, had enormous capital investments in the Balkan states and therefore had a vested financial interest for supporting the status quo. Moreover, France favored the status quo out of concern that the Balkans might fall under the complete control or influence of Austria-Hungary and Russia.⁶⁴ Germany stood behind Austria-Hungary in order to protect the integrity of the Habsburg Empire. Initially, opposed to war with the Ottoman Empire, when the

disintegration of the latter became inevitable, Germany worked with the assumption of a friendly Bulgarian state, an idea based on the German origin of the Bulgarian king.⁶⁵

Although officially a supporter of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, given the latter's rapid decline, Britain came to support, and encourage, the idea of national states for the Balkan peoples. The primary strategic focus of British interest, nonetheless, was the Strait—the route to India and the Middle East—and London objected to “the establishment of Slav dominance and increased Russian influence over the eastern part of the Ottoman Empire.”⁶⁶

The policy of Austria-Hungary was to secure land in the Balkans not only at the expense of the Ottoman Empire but also to counter Russian influence. Austria-Hungary sought to impede growth of South Slav nationalism—considering growing Serbian power with unease—and to prevent spread of Russian influence to the Mediterranean. These aims resonated greatly with those of Italy, especially with regard to the delineation of Albania's borders and Italian efforts to check Serbian and Greek expansion in the region. In general, Rome was favorably disposed toward Belgrade and sympathetic to Serbia's enlargement but could not support Serb ambition to reach the Adriatic Sea through the conquest of northern Albania. As the Italian Foreign Minister Antonino di San Giuliano pointed out, “This pretence—we cannot hide it—would hardly be compatible with the Italian interests in that sea and would be certainly in contradiction not only with the principle of Albanian autonomy and integrity, which we constantly proclaimed and supported, but also with the principle of nationality, to which both Italy and Serbia owe their own existence.” Both Austria-Hungary and Italy were keen to prevent Serbia from obtaining an outlet to the Adriatic Sea through the coastal Albanian city of Durrës.⁶⁷

Moreover, Italy in particular was hesitant about Montenegro's expansion into the Albanian city of Shkodër and adamant that the Strait of Corfu would not remain under the exclusive control of Greece.⁶⁸ The outcome of these diplomatic maneuvering was a new Albanian state deprived of the mainly Albanian regions of Kosova and Western Macedonia whose Albanian population has been subjected repeatedly to policies of forced assimilation and ethnic cleansing, omissions that have represented major causes of Albanian resentment ever since.

In drawing Albanian frontiers the Great Powers proceeded on the basis of the presumption that preserving peace in Europe should take precedence over considerations of ethnic composition of territories. As the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, stated in his August 12, 1913 comments before the House of Commons, "the basic objective of the agreement on Albanian borders was to satisfy the Great Powers, but many criticisms could be raised by anyone who really knew Albania and viewed the issue from the country's viewpoint. ... [I]n the course of the efforts to find a solution, the main goal has been to preserve intact the agreement among the Great Powers and if the decision on Albania has attained this, then it has performed the most important duty to the benefit of peace in Europe,"⁶⁹

The management of the Balkan conflicts was perceived by the Great Powers as a top-down, problem-solving process that invoked the sovereign statesman who would construct a limited (negative-sum) version of peace centred on the preservation of the national interest. As implied in the statement of the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, justice must remain subservient to stability. In this fashion, Great-Power diplomacy conditioned to a large extent the formation of the Balkan states; it shaped the size, configuration and even the existence of each one of them. European powers were constantly engaged in the Balkans

guided by knowledge acquired in their own processes of state formation in the West and a vision of relative national homogeneity that was functional in the West European setting but not so compatible with the multiethnic composition and fluid identification of peoples in the Balkan context.⁷⁰

The task of drawing national borders and assigning peoples to the emerging states was daunting. All the Balkan states had ethnic minorities within their borders and co-ethnics outside them. Most of these states had also “constitutive myths that urged the re-establishment of medieval or ancient borders regardless of ethnic demography,” myths and aspirations that influenced their foreign policies and sometimes found expression in revisionist ideologies and exclusivist policies.⁷¹ Ethnic minorities were routinely targeted with forced assimilation and physical removal. The group that suffered most were the Muslims. Justin McCarthy, an authoritative Ottoman scholar, has noted that at the outset of the Balkan Wars, the Muslim population of Ottoman Europe was slightly over 50%—Turks in the East, Albanians in the West. 27% of the Turks of Ottoman Europe died in the course of the Balkan Wars and 18% were surviving refugees.⁷² At the same time, abhorrent acts of violence were committed also by Muslim militias on Christians. Moreover, from 1870s onward Christian on Christian violence was rampant. Although the culprits of violence were state-armed forces and/or armed bands, the vast majority of victims were Christians.⁷³

Shifting focus away from these outbreaks of violence, the Great Powers adopted a rhetoric of national liberation from the Ottoman Empire, in referring to the Balkan Wars. This discourse permeated the European newspapers and analytical reports of these wars at the time that virtually uniformly favored the Balkan League while overlooking abominable wrongdoings of these states. In unison with their policy makers, the European publics were

characteristically anti-Muslim, not concerned with the atrocities perpetrated against the Muslims (whereas those against the Christians produced outrage in the European capitals), and fully supportive of Balkan elites aspirations of expanding the nation state model in Europe's outskirts.⁷⁴

CONCLUSION

This article contributes to peace and conflict studies literature by offering conceptual and empirical observations pertaining to correlations between state making and political violence in the south east corner of the European continent in the context of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, which cemented the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of modern Balkan states. It sheds light on the root causes of these wars; highlights the effect of these wars on regional state making policies; and underscores the comparisons and contrasts between the development of nation-states in Western Europe and those in the Balkans.

The South East European states—Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, Serbia—began their state formation processes under conditions of Ottoman decay in the nineteenth century, joining the society of states (nearly all of them along the current borders) at the end of the Balkan Wars as the Ottoman Empire was dismantled. Breaking away from a land empire—as opposed to a sea empire—provided for relatively lengthy entanglements between the new emerging states and their ruling empire, entanglements that took the form of complex confrontations—including war—frequently mediated by dominating powers of the time.

Formation of the Balkan states was conditioned by existing practices, and by knowledge accumulated in the preceding processes of state formation in the Western part of the European continent. Hence this article has aimed to contribute above and beyond the existing

state of scholarship by grounding its analysis on a focused and explicit comparison between state formation in the Balkan case and that of Western European countries, focusing primarily on the *initial* stages of these processes when configurations of states are determined, and recognized, in the inter/national setting. The value of this comparison lies in casting into sharper relief what is distinctive and what is familiar in the processes of state formation in West and South East Europe.

Although a peasant population base is a common denominator in the initial stages of state formations in West and South East Europe the time frame of these processes was significantly shorter in the latter than the former. That state formation was compressed in time in the Balkans implied greater challenges and potentially greater human costs especially since people had fluid identities and, initially, weak national commitments that subjugated them, not infrequently, to competing political projects of nation building. This is not to suggest that state formation in Western Europe did not cost tremendously in death, suffering, loss of rights and unwilling surrender of land, goods, or labour—as Charles Tilly and his collaborators have argued.⁷⁵ Maria Todorova observes in *The Trap of Backwardness*, for instance, that “a process of consolidation of homogenous dynastic, religious, and ethnic states has been taking place in Europe since the fifteenth century ... [a] process that may be described as ethnic and religious cleansing. Nation building and consolidation is a dynamic process that in Europe has taken several centuries and is not yet completed.”⁷⁶ States cannot be formed without great costs. Indeed, just as in the case of Western Europe, nation-building in the Balkans exacted a tremendous human cost in the long, elusive drive toward the fleeting dream of ethnic purity.⁷⁷

War has had a strong effect on the creation and alteration of state configuration in the West. This pertains also to the case of the Balkans. Indeed, war has been the performative force, the *coup de force*, which has transformed political and social reality, and has mediated delineation of state boundaries that have enclosed the political community of the modern nation. The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913—which historicity this article has explored—can be viewed as the midwife of the modern Balkan states serving directly the drawing of borders, national elites’ attempts at homogenizing highly heterogeneous populations, and broadening participation of masses in national politics. They were the most powerful tool both for state- and nation building. These wars can be viewed as a “creative destruction” in the course of which a new political order was established out of the ashes of a multi-ethnic empire.⁷⁸ Not only were they a means to the extraction of land and resources, but, crucially, they reinforced a new political discourse grounded on the ideology of nationalism—based on an ethno-cultural interpretation of nationhood—as a source of legitimation for the new nation states; an ideology that did not condition formation of the West European states. Violence of war, however, was not an exclusive generative force in state formation. External forces played a crucial role.

Unlike West European states, the processes of formation of the modern Balkan states were not internally determined. Processes of state formation in the Balkans have been triply external: the new states were formerly colonial possessions of the Ottoman Empire and were involved in relatively lengthy entanglements with the latter; the new states built institutions (of governance and the army) influenced by Western models; Balkan states depended for recognition and admission in the society of states on the support of the Great Powers. Specifically, the formation of nation states in South East Europe as a means of solving the Eastern Question was conditioned by the interests of the Great Powers of the time which

prioritized stability over justice. That Balkan states emerged at a time when a successful model of the nation state was operational in Western Europe meant that, even if theoretically some other alternatives might have existed, the pull of the successful model was very great and therefore the maneuverability of the Balkan states was severely restricted. The experience, knowledge, and interests of the Great Powers endowed them with significant leverage over Balkan national elites.

In the final analysis, revisiting the formation of South East European states in the context of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 remind us, as John Darwin noted, that we live in a world of states made of empires and among ethnic and national identities as often forged in collaboration with these empires as rallied against them.⁷⁹ Despite some relevant literature recently emerging with which this article has engaged, more than one hundred years after their conclusion these wars still remain insufficiently researched and comprehended. Furthering understanding of state formation processes in the Balkan setting the article has brought back in the role of war in such processes and also drawn attention to complexity and challenges that ethnic heterogeneity continues to posit to the international state system. In a context of state- and nation building characterized by abundant cultural heterogeneity and Great Power influence, this contribution has stressed the necessity of integrating these three aspects—namely, state building, nation building, and external impact—in future analyses of state formation in the Balkans and elsewhere.⁸⁰ Viewing the early stages of state formation in the Balkans expands upon the body of cases in peace studies that validate generalizations about correlation between state making and war, and stimulate informed critical evaluations of past conflicts with the view of helping peacebuilding practitioners to address future ones more effectively.

NOTES

¹ David P. Barash and Charles P. Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, Third Edition (Los Angeles: Sage, 2014),

20. Oliver P. Richmond, ed., *Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), especially “Introduction,” 3.

² Peace is not only difficult to achieve it is also a complex term that defies an all-encompassing, universal definition. At the most basic level, peace can be understood as absence of war or physical violence, a notion which Johan Galtung—a prominent peace researcher—termed “negative peace” as opposed to “positive peace” which denotes structural conditions conducive to political equality and social and economic justice. Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization* (Oslo: PRIO, 1996), 3. Peace may be conceived as a proactive phenomenon, a dynamic process of resolving disputes without violent conflict and transforming the conditions that cause war. David Cortright, *Peace: The History of Movements and Ideas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 8. For a comprehensive overview of the meaning of peace see Cortright, *Peace*; and Oliver P. Richmond, *A Very Short Introduction to Peace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

³ War can be understood as a collective activity (which *may* pertain to states and their policies) that rests on contention and involves intense, reciprocal use of force. One of war’s key characteristics is the capacity to transform the reality and social and political existence, war frequently being conceived as the means to a “superior peace”. Tarak Barkawi and Shane Brighton, “Absent War Studies?” in *The Changing Character of War* ed., Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 532.

⁴ See, for instance, Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) translated and edited by Peter Bondanella; Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) edited and translated by Peter Paret, Michael Howard, and Bernard Brodie; Kalevi J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); R. Harrison Wagner, *War and the State: The Theory of International Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007); Christopher Coker, *Barbarous Philosophers: Reflections on the Nature of War from Heraclitus to Heisenberg* (London: Hurst, 2010).

⁵ One of the best known of these works is *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975).

⁶ Jacques Derrida, “The Laws of Reflection: Nelson Mandela, in Admiration” in *For Nelson Mandela*, eds., Jacques Derrida and Mustapha Tlili, (New York: Seaver Books, 1987), 18.

⁷ The territory that once was known as the Ottoman Macedonia now lies within the borders of four states: the eponymous Republic, Greece (which contains a region called Aegean Macedonia); Bulgaria (which includes within its borders Pirin Macedonia); and Albania (which currently holds a diminutive section of historical Macedonia in the western shores of the Prespa and Ohrid lakes). See İpek Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties: Religion, Violence, and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878-1908* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2014), 9.

⁸ Klejda Mulaj, *Politics of Ethnic Cleansing: Nation-State Building and Provision of In/Security in Twentieth-Century Balkans* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), 89.

⁹ Siniša Malešević, *The Sociology of War and Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 183.

¹⁰ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992* (Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 1992), 70.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 71.

¹² Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making” in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly, 42.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 52.

¹⁴ Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, 116.

¹⁵ Figures from Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the 19th Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 3.

¹⁶ Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, 207.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 182.

¹⁸ Samuel E. Finer, “State- and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the Military”, in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* ed. Charles Tilly, 85-6.

¹⁹ For three distinct nation building processes—namely, accommodation, assimilation, and exclusion—see Harris Mylonas, *The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

²⁰ Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making” in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly, 70.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 34.

²² Ibid., 27, 77.

²³ Figures are from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1913), 418. Re-published in 1993: *The Other Balkan Wars: A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect with a New Introduction and Reflections on the Present Conflict*. Introduction by George F. Kennan. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993).

²⁴ Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1977), 67, 486; Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties*; and Theodora Dragostinova, *Between Two Motherlands: Nationality and Emigration among the Greeks of Bulgaria, 1900-1949* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011).

²⁵ Refer to Wolfram Fischer and Peter Lundgreen, “The Recruitment and Training of Administrative and Technical Personnel” in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly.

²⁶ Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” 70-71. In fact, Tilly acknowledges that the papers presented in his edited volume neglects the treatment of nation building in comparison with state building. Ibid., 80.

²⁷ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1.

²⁸ Nationalism is considered here to be a modern phenomenon, as defined by Gellner, rather than a primordial one.

²⁹ Mylonas, *The Politics of Nation-Building*, 56. See, also, Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1977).

³⁰ Sidney Verba, “Sequences and Development” in *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* ed. Leonard Binder and Joseph La Palombara, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 314.

³¹ Stein Rokkan, “Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations within Europe” in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly, 574. Rokkan is cited here not to suggest that his view meets universal approval, but because the notion of a temporal lag—the sense of belated arrival into a race between nations already underway—is widespread both in the self-representation of the non-western world and western interpretations of formation of states outside Western Europe. See, for instance, Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional*

Conflict, and International System (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). For an alternative view that interprets nationalism in Eastern Europe as a long-term process grounded on the idea of relative synchronicity refer to Maria Todorova, “The Trap of Backwardness: Modernity, Temporality, and the Study of Eastern European Nationalism,” *Slavic Review* 64, No. 1, (2005): 140-164.

³² Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, 224.

³³ Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” 44.

³⁴ One of the most authoritative accounts of these wars, including their causes, can be found in Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913: Prelude to the First War* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000). See also M. Hakan Yavuz and Isa Blumi, eds., *War and Nationalism: The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913, and Their Sociopolitical Implications* (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2013).

³⁵ The term “irredentism” derives from the Italian word *irridenta*. It refers to those territories, Trente, Dalmatia, Trieste, Fiume, which, although culturally Italian, remained under Austrian or Swiss rule and thus unredeemed after the Italian unification (in 1861). In modern political usage the term refers to territorial claims—usually supported by historical arguments—made by one state to lands within another. Unlike secession, whose success depends to a large extent upon group sentiment and loyalty, irredentist claims are fostered from above and are usually utilized by governments as a mobilization instrument, especially at times when support is particularly desired. See James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 57, 59, 61, 63.

³⁶ For the Eastern Question refer to A. L. Macfie, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923* (New York and London: Routledge, 1989).

³⁷ Sevtap Demirci, “Ottoman Disintegration in the Balkans and Its Repercussions” in *War and Nationalism: The Balkan Wars 1912-1913*, ed. Yavuz and Blumi, 558.

³⁸ The independence of these states amounted to loss of one-third of Ottoman territory at the time. J. Burbank and F. Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 358.

³⁹ Richard C. Hall, “Bulgaria and the Origins of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913”, in *War and Nationalism: The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913*, eds. Yavuz and Blumi, 85.

⁴⁰ Dimitris Livanios, *The Macedonian Question: Britain and the Southern Balkans 1939-1949* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 17. As Lord Beaconsfield (Benjamin Disraeli) noted, borders of San Stefano would

“make the Black Sea as much a Russian Lake as the Caspian.” Cited in John A R Marriott, *The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1947), 339.

<http://www.hse.ru/data/2013/01/14/1303221246/easternquestion2.pdf>

⁴¹ Richard J. Crampton, *A Concise History of Bulgaria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 83-84. Other provisions of the Berlin Treaty confirmed the independence of Serbia, Montenegro and Romania; Austria took control of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Ottoman Empire lost more than a third of its territory. For the Berlin Treaty refer to Peter Sluglett and M. Hakan Yavuz eds., *War and Diplomacy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and the Treaty of Berlin* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2011).

⁴² M. Hakan Yavuz, “Warfare and Nationalism: The Balkan Wars as a Catalyst for Homogenization,” in *War and Nationalism: The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913*, ed. Yavuz and Blumi, 52. Sevtap Demirci, “Ottoman Disintegration in the Balkans and Its Repercussions” in *War and Nationalism: The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913*, ed. Yavuz and Blumi, 559-60.

⁴³ Numerous local uprisings against the empire dented the authority and ability of the Ottoman government, also known as “the Porte”, to run and control Balkan lands. One significant revolt—prior to the Balkan Wars—was the Ilinden Uprising in Macedonia in 1903 (carried out by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—funded by the Bulgarian government). Another was the Kosovar Albanian revolt in 1910 led by Isa Boletini and Idriz Seferi against Young Turks’ policy of raising taxes, adaptation of Turkish as the language of provincial administration, disarming Albanians and conscripting them in the Ottoman Army. A subsequent Albanian revolt the following year showed the impossibility of maintaining the unity of population of the Ottoman Empire, even the unity of Muslim communities. This realization stimulated Turkish nationalism. Towards these uprisings the Ottomans reacted with overwhelming force which in turn alienated further the local population. John Darwin, ‘Empire and Ethnicity’ in *Nationalism and War* ed. John Hall and Siniša Malešević, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 228.

⁴⁴ Wesley Hiers and Andreas Wimmer, “Is Nationalism the Cause or Consequence of the End of Empire?” in *Nationalism and War*, ed. Hall and Malešević, 220.

⁴⁵ Siniša Malešević, “Obliterating Heterogeneity through Peace: Nationalisms, States and Wars in the Balkans” in *Nationalism and War*, ed. Hall and Malešević, 263.

⁴⁶ Roland Grigor Suny, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 14.

⁴⁷ Dragostinova, *Between Two Motherlands*, 14.

⁴⁸ M. Hakan Yavuz, “Warfare and Nationalism: The Balkan Wars as a Catalyst for Homogenization”, in *War and Nationalism: The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913*, ed. Yavuz and Blumi, 45. The local population spoke a Slavic dialect that resembled Bulgarian language. Serbs claimed that population of Macedonia was Serbian because their folk customs were similar to those of the Serbs. Greece claimed that the Slavic population of Macedonia were Slavic-speaking Greeks because they were Orthodox Christians.

⁴⁹ Cited in Dragostinova, *Between Two Motherlands*, 33.

⁵⁰ Duncan Perry, *The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian Liberation Movement 1893-1903* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988).

⁵¹ John R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a country*, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 91.

⁵² Ibid. Also, Demirci, “Ottoman Disintegration in the Balkans and Its Repercussions,” 559.

⁵³ Dragostinova, *Between Two Motherlands*, 22-23.

⁵⁴ Dimitris Livanios, *The Macedonian Question: Britain and the Southern Balkans 1939-1949* (Oxford University Press, 2008), 15.

⁵⁵ “Peacemaking” is used deliberately here to refer to actions or initiatives to bring hostile parties to agreement through peaceful means, primarily—in the context of this paper—by means of diplomacy. This is the meaning of the term used by policy makers and diplomats at the time of the Balkan Wars, a meaning that resonates with the definition of peacemaking offered by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 report, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*, available at http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf. In the era of the United Nations (post-1945), “peacemaking” has been frequently used interchangeably with “peacebuilding”, the latter term encompassing “the full array of stages and approaches needed to transform conflict towards sustainable, peaceful relations and outcomes.” Oliver Ramsbotham, “Reflections on UN post-settlement peacebuilding”, *International Peacekeeping* 7, No. 1, (2000), 169-189 at 171. Strategies of peacemaking / peacebuilding have proliferated beyond use of diplomacy to include “peacekeeping” (deployment of lightly armed force for the purpose of observing a ceasefire) and less frequently “peace-enforcement” (threat, or use, of force to impose, maintain or restore a ceasefire)—both practices born in the post-World War II era when Cold War rivalries frequently threaten to paralyze the UN Security Council). See, for example, Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2nd edition (Polity Press, 2010). After the end of the Cold War another peacebuilding strategy emerged, namely,

“statebuilding”—as part of extensive Western intervening missions such as those in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq—involving establishment of democratic institutions and attitudes which could outlast the departure of intervenors and facilitate sustainable peace. See, for instance, Francis Fukuyama, *Statebuilding: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). See also *International Dialogue on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding*, <http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/>.

⁵⁶ Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, 207.

⁵⁷ For the former view refer to Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983). For the latter view refer to Todorova, “The Trap of Backwardness,” 140-164.

⁵⁸ Siniša Malešević, “Obliterating Heterogeneity through Peace: Nationalisms, States and Wars in the Balkans” in *Nationalism and War* ed. Hall and Malešević, 260.

⁵⁹ For instance, Stephen M. Saideman, “Discrimination in International Relations: Analyzing External Support for Ethnic Groups,” *Journal of Peace Research* 39, No. 1, (2002): 27-50.

⁶⁰ For instance, Mylonas, *The Politics of Nation Building*, 32, 47.

⁶¹ Richard J. Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878-1918: A History* (Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs Distributed by Columbia University Press, 1983), 37.

⁶² Demirci, “Ottoman Disintegration in the Balkans and Its Repercussions,” 560. Yavuz, “Warfare and Nationalism: The Balkan Wars as a Catalyst for Homogenization,” 53.

⁶³ For an in-depth analysis of great power diplomacy in the context of the Balkan Wars see Ernst Christian Helmreich, *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912-1913* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1969).

⁶⁴ Igor Despot, *The Balkan Wars in the Eyes of the Warring Parties: Perceptions and Interpretation* (Bloomington: iUniverse, Inc., 2012), 35.

⁶⁵ Demirci, “Ottoman Disintegration in the Balkans and Its Repercussions,” 561.

⁶⁶ Ibid.; Livanios, *The Macedonian Question*, 42.

⁶⁷ In general, Rome was favourably disposed toward Belgrade and sympathetic to Serbia’s enlargement but could not support Serb ambition to reach the Adriatic Sea through the conquest of northern Albania. As the Italian Foreign Minister—Antonino di San Giuliano—pointed out, “This pretence—we cannot hide it—would hardly be compatible with the Italian interests in that sea and would be certainly in contradiction not only with the principle of Albanian autonomy and integrity, which we constantly proclaimed and supported, but also with

the principle of nationality, to which both Italy and Serbia owe their own existence.” Cited in Francesco Caccamo, “The Balkan Wars in the Italian Perspective” in *War and Nationalism: The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913*, ed. Yavuz and Blumi, 237.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 238. Despot, *The Balkan Wars in the Eyes of the Warring Parties*, 36.

⁶⁹ Cited in Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo* (London: Hurst, 1998), 84.

⁷⁰ Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, Updated Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

⁷¹ Mylonas, *The Politics of Nation-Building*, 56.

⁷² Justin McCarthy, “Forced Migration and Mortality in the Ottoman Empire” (Washington D.C.: Turkish Coalition of America, 2010), 2. http://www.tc-america.org/files/grants/Forced_Displacement.pdf. For a detailed account of Christian atrocities perpetrated on Ottoman Muslim populations in the Balkans refer to Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922* (Princeton: Darwin, 1996).

⁷³ Rogers Brubaker, “Aftermaths of Empire and the Unmixing of Peoples,” in Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen eds., *After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1997).

⁷⁴ Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Intervention in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).

⁷⁵ Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” 71.

⁷⁶ Todorova, “The Trap of Backwardness,” 154.

⁷⁷ I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that this point be made explicit.

⁷⁸ The expression “creative destruction” comes from Yavuz, “Warfare and Nationalism: The Balkan Wars as a Catalyst for Homogenization,” 32.

⁷⁹ John Darwin, “Empire and Ethnicity,” in *Nationalism and War*, eds. Hall and Malešević, 168.

⁸⁰ The contemporary policy and praxis of peacebuilding in post-conflict setting has a clear state building component (in the form of institution building) and a prominent—if not dominant—external / international aspect. Much less emphasis is being placed on nation building even if the terms ‘state building’ and ‘nation building’ are used interchangeably by some authors. See, for instance, Francis Fukuyama eds., *Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2005). Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk eds., *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations* (London: Routledge, 2009).